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Abstract—This work presents a solution for error detection in 
ARM microprocessors based on the use of the trace infrastructure. 
This approach uses the Program and Instrumentation Trace 
Macrocells that are part of ARM’s CoreSight™ architecture to 
detect control-flow and data-flow errors, respectively. The 
proposed approach has been tested with low-energy protons. 
Experimental results demonstrate high accuracy with up to 95% 
of observed errors detected in a commercial microprocessor with 
no hardware modification. In addition, it is shown how the 
proposed approach can be useful for further analysis and 
diagnosis of the cause of errors. 
 
Index Terms— ARM, microprocessor trace, fault tolerance, 
error detection.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ROCESSORS for space applications are generally required to 
be hardened or tolerant to radiation effects. However, the 
available choices of rad-hard processors are scarce and very 
expensive. Moreover, rad-hard processors usually lag several 
generations behind COTS (Components Off-The-Shelf) 
microprocessors and SoCs (System on-a-Chip) [1], [2]. Thus, 
there is a growing interest in the use of COTS microprocessors 
in space applications, particularly for small satellites with tight 
budget constraints and missions that require high processing 
power. COTS microprocessors can enable scientific missions 
and reduce development time and cost, provided that sufficient 
error detection or mitigation is achieved [3]. 
Mitigation of radiation effects in COTS microprocessor is 
difficult because the hardware cannot be modified and there are 
many internal elements that are not accessible. Error detection 
and recovery is more generally used, which can be based on 
software-implemented fault tolerance or processor redundancy 
(e.g., lock-step techniques). Software techniques are limited 
and introduce severe penalties in terms of performance. 
Processor redundancy is costly in terms of hardware resources 
and power consumption. These approaches generally make use 
of external hardware units for comparison of the computation 
results and error checking [4-12].  
In this work we propose a solution based on on-chip trace 
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infrastructures for error detection in COTS microprocessors. 
Debug and trace macrocells are commonly included in COTS 
microprocessors to support the increasing complexity of 
software debugging tasks. However, once the application has 
been developed, they become useless and can be reused for on-
line monitoring in an inexpensive way. In particular, trace 
infrastructures can provide a good deal of information about the 
instructions executed by a microprocessor in a non-intrusive 
manner.  
The use of the trace interface for error detection and 
correction has been successfully demonstrated in [6], [7]. Errors 
are detected or corrected by observing the instruction flow and 
comparing it among several executions in the same processor 
or in different processors. Later works based on this idea [8-11] 
focused on soft cores, where the program-flow trace can be 
conveniently accessed through a raw or a custom interface. 
However, the access to the trace in COTS microprocessors is 
generally provided through hard macrocells that impose 
specific access protocols and limit the available information. 
Moreover, the program-flow trace can only detect control-flow 
errors. To cover data-flow errors, these techniques need to be 
combined with software-implemented techniques [8-10]. 
The processor selected for this work is an ARM 
microprocessor, which is a very popular choice in the 
commercial market. Debug and trace support is provided in the 
ARM processors by the CoreSight™ architecture. The ARM 
Cortex-A9 family of processors includes two CoreSight 
macrocells: the Program Trace Macrocell (PTM) and the 
Instrumentation Trace Macrocell (ITM). In the proposed 
approach, the PTM and the ITM are used to detect control-flow 
and data-flow errors, respectively. The program-flow trace is 
monitored through the PTM, while selected computed data are 
monitored through the ITM. Both traces are checked by an 
external hardware module developed for this purpose, that we 
have called Program & Data Trace Checker (PDTC). To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a full approach 
based on trace macrocells, intended to detect both control-flow 
and data-flow errors, is proposed and tested under radiation.  
In addition, the proposed approach can be useful for error 
diagnosis, as it is able to collect the trace of the processor at the 
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time an error occurs. To this purpose, a secondary experiment 
was performed using the Embedded Trace Buffer (ETB), which 
is another component included in the CoreSight™ architecture. 
The trace stored in the ETB was further analyzed to reconstruct 
the processor execution status at the time an error was detected. 
The remaining of this paper is as follows. Section II 
summarizes related work. Section III describes the proposed 
trace-based error detection approach. Section IV shows the 
experimental setup and the results using proton irradiation. 
Finally, section V presents the conclusions of this work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Conventional fine-grain hardware redundancy techniques, 
such as Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) or Triple Modular 
Redundancy (TMR) on flip-flops, are not suitable for COTS 
microprocessors because they require modification to the 
circuit. Thus, fault-tolerant architectures based on COTS 
microprocessors generally rely on software techniques, external 
hardware, or hybrid techniques that use a combination of both 
[12]. Microprocessor errors are usually divided into control-
flow errors and data errors. Control-flow errors affect the 
instruction flow, provoking incorrect jumps. Data errors affect 
the results of the computations. Each of these types of errors are 
usually addressed with different error detection or correction 
techniques. 
Software techniques are based on software modifications 
used to include redundancy in the operations performed by the 
microprocessor. They are quite convenient for microprocessors 
because they do not imply hardware modification. From this 
point of view, they can be considered more manageable than 
hardware modifications. Their common drawbacks are 
performance decrease and increased memory size. A large 
number of works proposing software techniques for both data 
and control-flow errors can be found in the literature. For data 
errors the most common and direct approach is data duplication 
[13], [14]. Data duplication techniques duplicate all data used 
by the microprocessor and check the consistency between the 
copies at several points of the executed program. Looking for a 
trade-off between performance and error coverage, the amount 
of duplicated data and checkpoints in the program may vary 
[16]. For control-flow errors, the most common software 
techniques are signature-based. These techniques assign a 
signature to each basic block of the executed code. Their goal 
is to validate the changes in the execution flow. Incorrect jumps 
in the execution flow can be detected by checking the 
signatures. Examples of this kind of techniques can be found in 
[15]. The most important drawbacks of signature-based 
techniques are that they generally require a large amount of 
memory to store the correct signatures in the system and 
signature computation and checking may introduce significant 
performance penalties. 
All software techniques present a common problem due to 
the intrinsic characteristics of these techniques. Their error 
coverage is limited to the parts of the architecture that can be 
accessed from the programmer’s side. With this approach, 
critical registers that are not accessible from software can be 
completely unprotected. 
Alternatively, hardware techniques can be used. In the case 
of COTS that cannot be modified, hardware techniques are 
implemented by external hardware connected to the 
microprocessor. The connection point is an issue itself, and 
observed information and results can vary depending on its 
location. Existing techniques are limited by the accessible 
connections and the kind of information they can provide. 
Memories storing data or program are a common choice but it 
must be noted that information is read or written by the 
microprocessor but it is not processed in the memory. An 
instruction can be read from memory and checked by external 
hardware but the error may appear when it is being executed in 
the microprocessor. The same reasoning can be translated to 
data stored in memory. The complexity of the external 
hardware can vary from very small and simple circuits to 
sophisticated ones with a complexity similar to the 
microprocessor to be monitored.  
A simple approach is to use the very same architecture to 
replicate the program execution and compare the results. This 
can be accomplished in several ways, using time redundancy or 
hardware redundancy. In the first case, the execution of the 
software is replicated and results are compared for error 
detection or correction. Error checking can be implemented in 
the software or in external hardware [4]. The latter option is 
more robust and contributes to reduce the performance 
penalties. Alternatively, two or more processors can be used to 
execute the same software in hardware redundancy. The 
increasing availability of multicore processors on a chip makes 
it an appealing approach. However, fault isolation is required to 
avoid that a fault in any single component leads to the failure of 
the entire chip [26]. External hardware modules are needed for 
error checking and management of the architecture. The DMT 
(Duplex Multiplexed in Time) and DT2 (Dual Duplex Tolerant 
to Transients) architectures developed by CNES [2] are good 
examples of the time redundancy and the hardware redundancy 
approaches, respectively.  
Lockstep [17], [18] is a micro-synchronization variant of the 
processor replication techniques. Lockstep works by executing 
the same application simultaneously and symmetrically in two 
identical processors. In an error-free execution, both processors 
are expected to perform the same operations in every clock 
cycle. A hardware checker module monitors both processors to 
detect any discrepancy, in which case the processors are 
restored to a safe state through a rollback mechanism. 
Except for pure software approaches, all fault-tolerant 
architectures based on COTS are generally hybrid, i.e., they 
require some software support (e.g., replication of the software 
or application of software-implemented fault tolerance 
techniques) as well as some hardware support to monitor the 
executions and check for errors. Hybrid approaches try to 
combine all the positive characteristics of both software and 
hardware techniques. Hardware techniques can help to reduce 
performance penalties while software techniques are better 
suited to deal with data errors. Examples of hybrid approaches 
can be found in [4], [5], [8], [9], [10], [11]. In these cases, the 
external hardware monitor is typically in charge of checking the 




Modern microprocessors usually provide a trace interface so 
that software can be debugged during the design cycle. This part 
of the circuit is not used during normal operation, so that it can 
be reused for other tasks. The use of the trace interface to 
observe microprocessor behavior by connecting an external 
hardware monitor was first proposed in [6]. The trace interface 
can provide the flow of instructions executed by the processor 
in a non-intrusive manner. For instance, in [9] this approach 
was used to monitor a LEON3 microprocessor through its trace 
interface with good error detection rates. Recent work for ARM 
processors [19] has proposed also the use of the trace interface 
to collect trace data and then recreate the control-flow graph 
off-line. 
To the best of our knowledge the trace information has been 
used so far for detecting control-flow errors [8-12]. However, a 
complete solution requires the detection of data-flow errors as 
well. To this purpose, these techniques are usually combined 
with software techniques for data-flow error detection [8-10]. 
In the approach proposed in this work, the trace interface is also 
used for on-line detection of data errors. 
III. TRACE-BASED ERROR DETECTION APPROACH 
In this paper, a novel error detection technique for COTS 
microprocessors is presented. The proposed approach is based 
on retrieving control-flow and data-flow information from the 
processor and use it to determine if execution is correct or not. 
The proposed approach has been developed for an ARM 
CORTEX™-A9 microprocessor and a hardware monitor 
(PDTC) has been developed as an IP core to observe the 
microprocessor through its trace interface. The PDTC can be 
implemented in external hardware or in programmable logic. 
For convenience, a Zynq-7010 All Programmable SoC [20] was 
used as a test platform and the PDTC was implemented in the 
Programmable Logic (PL) of the device. 
The CoreSight™ trace subsystem is provided along with the 
ARM cores. To setup the system, the necessary CoreSight 
components [21] must be configured and enabled in the 
microprocessor software initialization. CoreSight trace 
Subsystem and PDTC are connected through the Extended 
Multiplexed Input Output (EMIO) available on the Zynq SoC. 
The main elements involved in the system are displayed in  





Fig. 1. General trace-based error detection architecture 
 
A. CoreSight subsystem 
In our case, we focus on two different CoreSight 
components: the Instrumentation Trace Macrocell (ITM) [21] 
and the Program Trace Macrocell (PTM) [22].  
The ITM is a software-application driven trace source. It is a 
CoreSight component of the trace source class. The ITM 
produces various types of data packets of compressed 
information. The most interesting packet for our application is 
the SoftWare Instrumentation Trace (SWIT) packet, which 
exports through the trace interface any desired 32-bit data value 
related to the software. To trigger SWIT packet generation, 
software must write a value in any of the 32 stimulus ports of 
the ITM, which are mapped in memory as stimulus registers. 
When any of the stimulus registers is written, the ITM exports 
a SWIT packet indicating the number of the port (0-31) and the 
value of the written data in leading-zeroes compression. 
The PTM is a real-time module that provides instruction 
tracing of a processor. It is a CoreSight component of the trace 
source class based on the ARM Program Flow Trace (PFT) 
architecture specification [22]. The PTM also generates trace 
information organized in packets. Among all PTM packets, we 
focus on the ones that contain Program Counter (PC) address 
information (I-sync, Branch Address and Waypoint Update).  
A waypoint is a point where instruction execution by the 
processor might involve a change in the program flow. The 
PTM does not generate PC information unless a waypoint is 
reached. The PC address is presented in different formats 
depending on the packet: while I-sync packets always contain 
the full (32-bit) value of the Program Counter, the Branch 
Address and Waypoint Update packets are compressed and 
only contain the bits that have changed since the last PC address 
information. To maximize PC address available information 
from the trace port, the Branch Broadcasting option has been 
enabled on the PTM. With this option, the destination address 
for all branch instructions is included in the trace. When the 
waypoint does not provoke a change in the program flow (i.e. 
when a conditional branch is not taken), this situation is 
reported by an Atom packet. 
The trace information produced by the macrocells is 
combined by the Funnel, which is a CoreSight component of 
the trace link class. Every input channel can be enabled or 
disabled through user programmable configuration registers, 
and priority can also be selected for each one. 
Combined trace information is sent from the Trace Port 
Interface Unit (TPIU) to the PDTC through the EMIO interface. 
The TPIU is a CoreSight component of the trace sink class. To 
manage trace information coming from several sources, the 
Formatter [23] must be enabled on the TPIU. The Formatter 
rearranges trace information along with source IDs in a defined 
structure called frame. To increase flexibility, the TPIU 
includes FIFO queues and can output trace information 
synchronized with an independent clock. In our approach, the 
TPIU runs with the same clock as the PDTC. The TPIU has 





B. Program & Data Trace Checker 
The PDTC receives the trace information from the TPIU port 
and processes it on-line. It has been designed to reconstruct 
trace information from the trace frames and to identify all trace 
packets from both sources (ITM and PTM). First, the PDTC 
decodes relevant packets and extracts useful information about 
execution flow and software data values. Trace information is 
then directed to the Program Checker or the Data Checker 
according to its origin for the corresponding check to be 
performed. The PDTC is software-programmable via 
configuration registers, which can be accessed through the 
system bus (AXI) interface. In addition, its modular 
implementation enables flexibility and future scalability as 
more capabilities can be easily introduced without requiring 
modifications to the actual design. 
The retrieved program-flow information processed by the 
Program Checker is related to PC addresses. This information 
is used to implement a PC follower capable of updating the last 
known address executed by the processor, including exceptions. 
The PC address is then compared with up to eight user-
programmable address ranges to determine if execution has 
reached a forbidden or unexpected region. In such a case, an 
error signal is raised.  
The software data values obtained from the trace interface 
are related to the state of selected variables during execution, so 
the Data Checker can determine if their values are valid or not, 
using two different techniques described below. To this 
purpose, software is instrumented to write stimulus registers in 
relevant points of the execution. In this work, we propose to 
arrange groups among the 32 available stimulus registers and 
assign each of the groups to different functionalities as it is 
represented in Fig. 2. Thus, when the PDTC receives a SWIT 
packet, it extracts the stimulus register number from it, and 
depending of that number, the required checking is executed 
using the respective value. If an inconsistency is detected, an 





Fig. 2. Code instrumentation examples and Data Checker operation 
 
Related to software data, two different error detection 
techniques have been developed: range checking and value 
comparison. Range checking determines if relevant values are 
within a specified range. Ranges are critical when running loops 
or indexing arrays. The Data Checker can be configured for up 
to four programmable ranges. Value comparison is important to 
ensure correct execution of branch conditions or to check data 
consistency. To this purpose, some stimulus registers have been 
grouped by pairs and each pair has been assigned to one boolean 
operation (equal, not equal, greater than, greater or equal than), 
so the Data Checker can determine whether the received values 
satisfy the selected condition.  
Table I shows the synthesis results of the PDTC implemented 
in the programmable logic. The Checker requires a small 
amount of resources (4.8% and 3.2% of the available LUTs and 
flip-flops, respectively) and most of them are used for the Trace 
Decoder. In fact, the AXI interface, which is required to 
configure the Checker through the system bus, requires a 
similar amount of resources. Thus, the PDTC can be viewed as 





 # LUTs (% usage) #FFs (% usage) 
AXI Interface 425 (2.4%) 1073 (3.0%) 
PDTC 836 (4.8%) 1109 (3.2%) 
Total 1261 (7.2%) 2182 (6.2%) 
 
With respect to performance, a major advantage of trace 
subsystems is that they are implemented as a side channel that 
does not interfere with the execution of the application. As a 
matter of fact, trace subsystems are intended to deal with 
asynchronous events which are difficult to reproduce and 
debug, so they are designed to provide reliable information with 
minimal intrusiveness. The PTM does not introduce any time 
overhead. Compared to other control-flow checking techniques, 
[27] shows up to 61% performance overhead using signature-
based techniques and [4] shows up to 34% performance 
overhead using assertions. For data checking, the time overhead 
is proportional to the amount of stimulus register writes. The 
more stimulus register writes, the lower the error detection 
latency but the higher the performance overhead. This is a 
similar trade-off to the case of software implemented fault-
tolerance. However, the performance penalty is reduced in the 
proposed approach because the checking is performed 
externally and the software only needs to report the values. It 
also benefits from existing hardware resources to collect trace 
data on a side channel without affecting the execution. 
Importantly, the use of the trace interface does not introduce 
any delay penalty, unlike other approaches that require access 
to critical interfaces such as the memory bus [2], [4], [5], [8], 
[17]. Eventually, the ITM can introduce a significant 
performance overhead if there are many consecutive stimulus 
register writes. In such a case, we have experimentally observed 
that the ITM might stall the processor in order to avoid losing 
information. This problem can be solved, if needed, by 




through the stimulus registers. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A proton irradiation campaign was performed at CNA 
(Centro Nacional de Aceleradores) in Spain to validate the 
proposed approach. In the following subsections we describe 
the experimental setup and the radiation results. Finally, we 
describe how trace information can be analyzed using the 
proposed approach. 
A. Experimental setup 
For the radiation campaign we used an external beam line of 
the 18/9 IBA compact cyclotron. The Device Under Test (DUT) 
was irradiated in open air with 15 MeV protons. The energy of 
incident protons in the silicon active area is in the order of 10 
MeV. According to previous experiments [25], this energy is 
sufficient to produce SEEs in the 28 nm technology device 
without thinning it. 
We selected a Xilinx Zynq-7010 All Programmable SoC 
device for the experiments [20]. Zynq devices integrate hard- 
core ARM CORTEX™-A9 processors with SRAM-based 
FPGA. Our experiments were conducted over a basic 
commercial board (Zybo) with a XC7Z010 device that contains 
a dual core of ARM CORTEX™-A9. For the experiments only 
one of the cores was used at the nominal 650 MHz clock 
frequency. The PDTC was implemented in the Programmable 
Logic (PL) of the device. The PDTC can only detect errors in 
the ARM cores. To correct errors in the configuration memory 
of the PL that may affect the PDTC, we have used the Xilinx 
Soft Error Mitigation (SEM) Controller IP [24].  
We used an SD card to store the boot code, the bitstream and 
the application software. Upon power up, this information is 
loaded to the On-Chip Memory (OCM) of the microprocessor 
to configure the device and start operation.  
In order to control the DUT that is exposed to the beam, an 
external host has been connected to the Zybo board. The 
external host is in charge of the control of the DUT and the 
retrieval of information during the experiments. To this 
purpose, it is connected to the ARM core through a USB 
interface and to the error signals provided by the PDTC through 
dedicated pins. When an error is detected, the external host 
switches off the power of the device and then restarts it again. 
The system is also restarted in some other cases to ensure the 
experimental results are fair, as follows. The external host 
retrieves information from the SEM about errors in the 
programmable logic. When an unrecoverable error is detected 
by the SEM, the external host restarts the device. If the 
communication between the processor and the external host is 
experiencing a malfunctioning and the host receives corrupted 
data, the system is restarted as well. Unrecoverable SEM errors 
and communication errors are not taken into account in the 
results of the experiments reported in the next section. 
The PDTC is able to detect control-flow and data errors 
thanks to the information provided by the trace subsystem. In 
order to verify the correctness of the results obtained with the 
PDTC during the experiments, both error types were double 
checked by additional means. First, the external host controls 
the time required for the application and triggers a timeout error 
when it is exceeded. Second, data checks were implemented in 
the software as well. Every variable was duplicated and every 
operation was repeated for the duplicated variable. Consistency 
checks were implemented immediately after every variable and 
its copy were updated. At the end of every execution, the results 
were also compared with a golden reference.  
The Zybo board was partially covered, leaving only the DUT 
exposed to the beam. The external host was placed outside the 
beam. 
B. Radiation results 
The experiments were performed with three different 
software benchmarks: matrix multiplication (MMULT), 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and a recursive 
implementation of the sorting algorithm quicksort (QSORT). 
The benchmarks were run on bare metal, but they could also 
run in principle on an operating system because the 
configuration and instrumentation is made at high level. All 
benchmarks implemented duplicated variables and consistency 
checks in the software according to the approach described in 
the previous section. Data values were sent through the ITM 
ports to be checked by the PDTC. In the current 
implementation, the checks were configured by hand, but an 
automatic tool is feasible. Thanks to the combination of error 
detection in the software and external monitoring we were able 
to double check all the observed errors reported by the PDTC. 
MMULT benchmark is characterized by intensive data-flow 
operations (multiply-accumulation) and few control decisions. 
For the experiments we used matrices of 32x32 data size. AES 
is an encryption algorithm which is characterized by intensive 
shifting and logical operations. It makes a high usage of XOR 
operations. The tested implementation uses a key length of 256 
bits and 10 iterations. 
QSORT is a sorting algorithm which is characterized by 
intensive use of control decisions and few computational 
operations. This algorithm could be considered as opposite to 
MMULT with respect to the structure of the code and the type 
of executed instructions, because it has a more complex control-
flow and uses simpler operations. Our implementation of this 
algorithm was done in a recursive way to test also how the 
proposed approach works with intensive function calls. For 
QSORT algorithm we used vectors of 500 elements. 
The performance overhead caused by stimulus register writes 
depends on the ratio of reported data to the instructions required 
to compute them. We instrumented the benchmarks to report all 
computed data and indices of the loops as they are being 
produced. With this approach, the overhead was 11% for 
MMULT, 20% for AES, including intermediate results after 
each iteration, and 51% for QSORT. The latter has the worst 
ratio between reported data and instructions. For the radiation 
experiments we included additional data register writes to 
increase observability of intermediate operations.  
All benchmarks were compiled with SDK Xilinx tool and 
minimum optimization effort (-O0) to preserve data-flow 
duplication. Table II shows the results of the radiation 




experimental results for each benchmark, namely MMULT, 
AES and QSORT. Every row reports the observed errors for a 
particular error category for all benchmarks. Errors are reported 
in number and percentage with respect to the total number of 
observed errors for each benchmark.  
The first three rows of Table II report the errors detected by 
the PDTC, divided in three subcategories (Det. TO, Det. Data 
and Det. OP). The fourth and fifth rows report the errors 
undetected by the PDTC, divided in two subcategories (Undet. 
TO and Undet. Data). And finally the last two rows provide the 
total number of errors (TOTAL ERRORS) and the total number 
of errors detected by the PDTC (TOTAL DET). 
The error categories used in Table II are defined as follows:  
• Det. TO (Detected Timeout error): The PDTC detects an 
error that is confirmed by a host timeout error. 
• Det. Data (Detected Data error): The PDTC detected a 
data error which is also detected by a software check 
(discrepancy in duplicated data or in the final result). 
• Det. OP (Error detected only by the PDTC): the PDTC 
raises an error that is not detected by the software 
checking or the host. 
• Undet. TO (Undetected Timeout error): the host detects 
a timeout condition but the PDTC does not raise an error. 
• Undet. Data (Undetected Data error): Data errors that are 
only detected by software checks. 
 
TABLE II 
RADIATION RESULTS: OBSERVED ERRORS 
 
ERRORS MMULT AES QSORT 
Det. TO 61 (19.06%) 51 (17.41%) 81 (32.27%) 
Det. Data 234 (73.13%) 189 (64.51%) 111 (44.22%) 
Det. OP 11 (3.44%) 25 (8.53%) 23 (9.16%) 
Undet. TO 7 (2.19%) 22 (7.51%) 24 (9.56%) 
Undet. Data 7 (2.19%) 6 (2.05%) 12 (4.78%) 
TOTAL  
ERRORS 
320 (100%) 293 (100%) 251 (100%) 
TOTAL  
DET 
306 (95.63%) 265 (90.44%) 215 (85.66%) 
 
In the experiments we observed a total of 320 errors for 
MMULT benchmark, 293 for AES benchmark and 251 for 
QSORT benchmark. The detection capability of the PDTC 
varies from 85.66% of detected errors for QSORT to 95.63% 
for MMULT. The latter result is in line with that reported in 
[28] for a hybrid approach with a simpler soft core processor 
(miniMIPS) under neutron radiation. The variations in the error 
detection capabilities of the PDTC with respect to the different 
benchmarks are related with the characteristics of the codes. 
The worst case results are obtained for QSORT, which is the 
benchmark that has a more complex control flow. Moreover, 
this benchmark uses recursiveness, which makes the stack 
pointer a very critical register in this case. However, the stack 
pointer was not checked by the PDTC in the used 
implementation.  
A few errors were only detected by the PDTC (Det. OP). The 
causes of these errors may vary. They may be temporary errors 
that are eventually corrected or errors that remain latent and 
may cause a malfunction later on. They may also be errors in 
the Coresight trace subsystem or in the PDTC. It must be noted 
that the trace subsystem could not be protected because it is part 
of the microprocessor. The PDTC was partially protected by the 
SEM. Nevertheless, the amount of errors of Det.OP category is 
small, ranging from 3.5% to 9.1%. In any case, it is generally 
advisable to consider them as errors and restart the system in 
these cases. For the experiments we have considered Det. OP 
errors as real errors and they have triggered a system restart. 
The latency of error detection is very small because the trace 
information is transmitted as a data stream that is directly 
captured by the PDTC from the TPIU. As a matter of fact, we 
have experimentally realized that the error signals provided by 
the PDTC are generally raised before the error is confirmed by 
the microprocessor. We have estimated the latency by 
artificially forcing an error and measuring the time until the 
processor catches an interrupt produced by the PDTC error 
signals with a timer. The average measured latency was 225 
processor clock cycles (345 ns at the processor clock frequency 
of 650 MHz). This includes the time used for the Coresight 
subsystem to encode and transfer the corresponding data 
packet, and for the PDTC to decode the packet, detect the error 
and signal it. Note that the TPIU and the PDTC run at a lower 
clock frequency (150 MHz) than the processor and the TPIU 
port was configured for a small data width (8 bits). In the 
current implementation, the PDTC uses 153 ns (23 clock cycles 
at 150 MHz clock frequency) to detect and signal an error, 
which is about 45% of the total latency. These choices can be 
optimized to reduce the error detection latency. It must be noted 
that previous works using on-line control-flow checking from 
an external hardware monitor were developed for soft cores. In 
these cases, the error detection latency is not reported but it is 
presumably minimal, because the external hardware monitor is 
connected to the memory bus or to a raw trace interface. 
However, in a hard core processor, neither of these interfaces is 
generally available. Nevertheless, the proposed approach can 
achieve an acceptable error detection latency using the built-in 
trace subsystem. 
Table III shows the fluence and the cross-section for all 
benchmarks. The cross-section reported in the second row 
(Cross-section, All errors) takes into account all the observed 
errors. In the third row (Cross-section, Undetected errors), the 
reported cross-section has been computed taking only into 
account the errors that were undetected by the PDTC. The 
results reported in Table III show the high error detection 
capabilities of the proposed approach, with a reduction in cross-
section up to two orders of magnitude when the PDTC is used. 
This is a remarkable result because the PDTC is only using 
some basic features and there is room for improvement with 
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C. Trace information analysis 
As a proof of concept, a secondary experiment was 
performed with the same DUT and software benchmarks. Its 
main purpose is to test the diagnosis capabilities of the trace 
information. It has been performed preventing any disturbance 
to the primary experiment about detection capabilities under the 
radiation conditions explained before. To enable this 
experiment, the Embedded Trace Buffer (ETB) [21] was used 
to store and retrieve the trace information. 
The ETB is a CoreSight component of the trace sink class. It 
is provided within the processing system of the Zynq SoC and 
it is internally connected to the same trace bus than the TPIU, 
so it receives the very same information that is processed by the 
PDTC. The ETB has been enabled and its Formatter has also 
been configured with the same parameters as the TPIU 
Formatter to produce the same data. The ETB contents can be 
accessed through the AXI interface using memory mapped 
registers available from the software application. The ETB 
buffer size is 4 kilobytes. 
The ETB is continuously storing the trace interface in a 
circular manner, so that, at any time, it contains the most recent 
trace information. Taking advantage of the detection 
capabilities of the PDTC, trace capture can be disabled just at 
the time an error is detected, so a snapshot of the trace remains 
in the buffer and can be accessed later, either on-line or off-line. 
In our experiment, the buffer was recorded in the external host 
for off-line analysis. 
When an error is detected, the software first checks for data 
consistency. Then, just before the system is rebooted, the 
software enters a function that reads the ETB and sends its 
contents through a serial port. This is what we have called a 
trace dump. The external host receives the trace dump and 
stores it in independent files. 
To analyze the trace information, our approach is to simulate 
the PDTC for the collected trace dumps. This way, we can know 
exactly how the PDTC has processed the trace information. 
This simulation approach has also been helpful to identify 
PDTC design errors in the initial versions of its development. 
A test bench has been designed to get the data directly from the 
trace dump files and use it as input stimuli for the PDTC in 
VHDL simulation, so the evolution of the internal signals can 
be easily tracked. This approach does not require complete trace 
information since the beginning of the software execution 
because the PDTC can get synchronized using synchronization 
packets. The only requirement is to have enough trace 
information prior to the error to let the PDTC synchronize 
before the error appears. 
Using the technique explained above, it is possible to 
reconstruct the processor execution status in the moment of an 
error. The available information for this analysis can be as rich 
as needed, since the software can be extensively instrumented 
by adding instructions to export any variable value in any point 
of execution. The combination of variable instrumentation with 
program counter information enables promising novel 
diagnosis capabilities to evaluate circuit reliability and the 
effectiveness of fault-tolerance techniques. In addition, 
obtained diagnostics could be applied to the development of 
more complex, new detection techniques. 
Although the presented work is a first approach, and major 
improvements can still be done, it has been possible to 
experimentally confirm the trace information capabilities to 
reconstruct the execution status. In particular, for the detected 
timeout errors (Det. TO in Table II), it was verified that an out-
of-range PC address was found on the program trace. A wrong 
PC address can provoke a jump to an invalid code region that 
causes the processor to hang. The PC addresses can be checked 
with the original program to locate the wrong instruction that 
was being executed when the error happened. A similar analysis 
was performed for data errors to verify that there was incorrect 
data on the data trace. In all the cases that a trace dump related 
to a detected error has been analyzed, the information contained 
in the trace dump confirmed the detected error. 
We could also analyze the errors detected by the PDTC that 
were not detected by the software checks (Det. OP in Table II). 
These errors can have a variety of sources. They may 
correspond to benign execution errors, i.e., errors that do not 
cause malfunctioning, but also to errors inside the Coresight 
trace subsystem or the PDTC. However, with the current 
implementation it is not generally possible to know exactly 
where the error occurred. It must be noted that the Coresight 
trace subsystem is susceptible to errors and it cannot be 
hardened as we used a commercial device. The PDTC can be 
hardened, but the benefits would be marginal due to its 
relatively small size in comparison with the Coresight trace 
subsystem. The PDTC used in the experiments was 
implemented in the PL and we used the SEM IP to correct 
configuration memory errors. If the collected trace dump 
contains an error that is verified by simulating it with the PDTC, 
it may be a benign error or an error in the Coresight subsystem. 
If the collected trace dump does not trigger the PDTC error 
detection, it may be an error in the PDTC or an error at the 
TPIU. Both cases were observed in the collected trace dumps. 
However, the amount of trace dumps that we were able to 
collect for this type of errors was small and additional 
experiments are required in order to reach to a conclusion about 
the relative sensitivity of each component in the trace 
processing chain. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 




detection in ARM microprocessors based on available on-chip 
trace infrastructures. A hardware module is used to monitor 
both the program-flow trace and a highly configurable data 
trace. This approach can be extended to other COTS 
microprocessors that support program and data tracing. 
Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approach 
has a high error detection capability, even though only some 
basic checks were implemented. Control-flow errors are 
detected in a non-intrusive manner and with no performance 
penalty. Data can be reported for checking through the trace 
interface, at the expense of a time overhead that is proportional 
to the amount of stimulus register writes. Error detection 
latency is small, despite the fact that trace information has to 
traverse the trace subsystem. In summary, the trace interface is 
a viable means to implement error detection in COTS 
microprocessors. Additionally, traces can be collected for 
further analysis and diagnosis of the cause of errors.  
This work has shown that the checking of trace information 
has a great potential to detect and diagnose radiation induced 
errors in complex microprocessors. Future work is oriented to 
improve the error detection rate, by making a more elaborated 
use of the rich information that the trace subsystem can provide, 
and to improve the diagnosis capabilities. 
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